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BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is
an Appeal from a final order of the Third District Court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

DID THE LOWER COURT MAKE A FINDING THAT THE MONEY
TRANSFERRED OVERSEAS, IN AUGUST OF 1991, HAD A VALUE OF
$870,000.00 AT THE TIME OF TRIAL.

2.

COULD THE DISTRICT COURT HAVE MADE A FINDING, AT THE
TIME OF TRIAL, CONCERNING THE VALUE OF THE MONEY
TRANSFERRED OVERSEAS IN AUGUST 1991.

3.

CAN THE COURT AT THE TIME OF A REMAND HEARING MAKE A
NEW FINDING WITHOUT NEW EVIDENCE.

COMES NOW, the Appellant, Larry R. Perkins and moves this Honorable Court for
reconsideration of the Court's Memorandum Decision, or in the alternative requests the Court
grant him oral argument in the matter. This Motion is brought pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah
Rules of Appellant Procedure concerning petitions for re-hearing.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Appellant, Larry R. Perkins appealed to this Court a final Order in the form of a
Decree of Divorce, rendered by the Honorable Judge Leslie A. Lewis of the Third Judicial
District Court below. His brief on appeal was filed the 31st of January, 1994, the Respondent
filed a responsive brief, and the Appellant filed a reply.
This Court had the matter under advisement, and the parties awaited an invitation for oral
1

argument. The Court apparently decided the case on its own Motion, pursuant to Rule 31 of
the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure apparently deciding that the matter had uncomplicated
factual issues, or uncomplicated issues of law as described in Rule 31(b) Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure. The Memorandum Decision was filed, and mailed to counsel, April 13, 1995.
In its memorandum decision that Court stated that "the trial Court identified as marital
property $870,000.00 received from the sale of apartments." The Court further stated in its
memorandum decision "based on its findings, the trial Court was able to identify marital assets
of at least $1,405,806.00."
The distinction the Appellant wishes to point out is the difference between the value of
a marital asset eighteen (18) months before trial and the court's inability to make a finding
concerning the same money at the time of trial. The trial court did identify $870,000 in marital
property sent overseas to pay a mortgage obligation eighteen (18) months before trial. The
lower court however, specifically did not make a finding as to the value of any money overseas
at the time of trial, because it could not. The Respondent had the burden of establishing that
value at trial, and did not attempt to do so. The lower court correctly concluded that it could
not make a finding as to the value of any overseas asset.
This Court agreed with the Appellant that the Findings of Fact published by the Court
below did not support the outcome, and remanded the matter for trial. This Court however, in
footnote number one to its decision, invites the District Court, if it cannot support its current
disproportionate award with new findings, to simply let Mrs. Perkins retain the domestic assets
previously awarded her, and give her a smaller fractional share of the overseas assets, upon
which a value has never been placed. Such a suggestions, as currently contained in footnote one
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of the memorandum decision, compounds, rather than solves, the problem.
The Appellant asserts in this petition for re-hearing, or reconsideration that the Court has
overlooked or misapprehended the nature of the dispute, the facts surrounding what the lower
Court actually found, and did not find, and the law involved.
The Appellant asserts that the lower Court did not value the marital estate at
$1,405,806.00, and specifically that the Trial Court could not, and did not attach any value to
any overseas assets. Appellant asserts that the lower court correctly did not do so in that there
was no evidence presented at the time of trial as to those assets' value, if any.
The Appellant agrees and accepts all other portions of the Court's memorandum decision.
The Appellant requests that the Court reconsider this, and reissue an amended
memorandum decision, or in the alternative, allow the parties oral argument in the matter.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The District Court absolutely did not, and could not, make a finding at the time of trial
as to the value of the money earlier transferred to the Singapore Corporation. The Court made
a finding that the $870,000.00 was transferred overseas in August of 1991. The appellant's
testimony, as is contained in the transcript, was that this money was sent to Yen Yang
Corporation, a Singapore Corporation, to pay off the mortgage owed on the Royal Garden
Apartments. Documents were produced at trial showing that the money had been borrowed to
buy the apartments, a promissory note signed, and that a subsequent mortgage was recorded in
Salt Lake County, securing the lender corporation. This testimony was unrefuted.
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In paragraph nineteen (19) of its Findings of Fact, the lower court found that the
appellant's testimony was lacking in credibility, that he controlled the Singapore corporation,
and that the court could not put a value on the corporation for lack of evidence. The court
found that the reason that there was a lack of evidence was because the Appellant was hiding
assets. The court make no finding as to what efforts the Plaintiff/Respondent made to discover
the truth about this issue, or what the Appellant had done to hide them. The lower court simply
found that the Appellant was not a credible witness.
The appellant vigorously denied any ownership or control in the Singapore corporation.
Without regard for the reasons why, there was simply no evidence at trial to support a finding
concerning the value of any alleged overseas asset of the parties.
The lower court did not make a finding that the Singapore corporation had $870,000.00,
or had any value at the time of trial, or that the Appellant had gotten any of the money. There
was absolutely no evidence presented at the time of trial as to what the Company's financial
condition was, or if it existed. The Respondent, before trial, sought and obtained two (2)
extensions of time in which to do overseas discovery, and then did none. This is uncontroverted.
The Plaintiff/Respondent, instead relief on her hope that the lower court, if it disbelieved the
Appellant, and found him to be a liar, would be tempted to, and would in fact, exceed its
authority, and attempt to punish him for lying, by granting the Respondent a disproportionate
share of the estate.
This Court, in its memorandum decision, has suggested to the District Court that if no
new findings can be made, it can simply rest on its initial findings, but take away from the
Plaintiff her one-half share of foreign assets, and that this will solve the problem. This will not
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solve the problem. Without new evidence, which will support findings concerning the value of
overseas assets at the time of trial, the trial Court will be in no better position to make adequate
findings at a remand hearing, than it was originally.

ARGUMENT

I.

DID THE LOWER COURT MAKE A FINDING THAT THE MONEY
TRANSFERRED OVERSEAS, IN AUGUST OF 1991, HAD A VALUE OF
$870,000.00 AT THE TIME OF TRIAL?

The answer to this question is clearly no. The Court's findings on this issue were
contained in Findings no. eighteen (18) and nineteen (19) which stated "Sale of the Royal
Garden. In August 1991 Defendant sold his interest in the Royal Garden Apartments for
$1,000,000.00 and transferred $870,000.00 overseas to Singapore." Finding No. 19 states that

Defendant's Overseas Assets. Although the Defendant testified that he had no
overseas assets and that the $870,000.00 in proceeds from the sale of the Royal
Garden Apartments was transferred by him to Singapore to pay a debt he owed
Yen Yang Shipping Company, the Court finds Defendant's testimony to be
lacking in credibility on this point. The Court carefully listed to the totality of
the testimony, considered Defendant's appearance and demeanor to arrive at this
finding. The Court heard and considered the testimony of Kay Jones McDonald
concerning Defendant's relationship with Yen Yang Shipping Company. The
Court finds that Ms. McDonald was a very credible witness and clearly testified
that Yen Yang was his based on her observations in Singapore when she was with
the Defendant. The Court has also considered Exhibit 40 which it finds
significant in arriving at this finding.
From documents introduced into evidence, (including Exhibit 40), and
from the testimony of witnesses at trial the Court finds that the Defendant
currently has undetermined but substantial assets overseas which are under his
control and which he is hiding from Plaintiff and this Court. Defendant's denial
5

of the existence of these assets is not credible. The Court further rules that the
Plaintiff should be awarded one-half of the Defendant's overseas assets, the exact
dollar amount to be determined when and if such information becomes available.
[Emphasis added]
Three things are undeniable with regard to the above two referred to findings:
1. The trial Court thought the Appellant was a liar;
2.

The lower Court believed that the $870,000.00 mortgage debt owed on the

Apartments, was owed to a Company in Singapore which Appellant controlled; and,
3. That there was no evidence before the Court upon which it could base a finding as
to the then value, that is, the value at the time of trial of the previously transferred $870,000.
For this reason, the lower Court awarded the Respondent one-half of the unvalued,
unquantifiable assets.
Appellant denied that he had any interest or control in the Singapore Company to which
the $870,000.00 mortgage was paid.

A former girlfriend of Larry Perkins, Kay Jones

McDonald testified at trial that she had been to Singapore with Larry on a trip, and that she
could tell that Larry had control of the Singapore Corporation. The Court disbelieved Larry
Perkins, and believed Kay Jones McDonald.
The Appellant's point in this Motion for re-hearing or reconsideration of the
memorandum decision is that Judge Lewis knew that there was no evidence before her as to the
value of those monies on the date of trial. Not a shred of evidence was presented concerning
the mortgage monies and what had happened to them after being paid to the Singapore Company
to retire the mortgage debt the parties had owed. The lower Court was correctly concerned that
it knew nothing of the mortgage company's debt structure, investors identities, shares
outstanding, financial condition, cash on hand, or any other information which would allow it
6

to put a value on this corporation the Appellant was found to control.
The lower Court, obviously suspected that there could be a large amount of money sitting
overseas over which the Defendant/Appellant had control, but there simply no basis upon which
the Court could value it. The fact that the asset had a dollar value of $870,000.00 eighteen (18)
months earlier, in August, 1991, did not help the lower Court in making a finding as to its value
some eighteen months later, in February, 1993 when the trial took place.
This Court's memorandum decision, in footnote one, suggests that the problem of the
Court's findings can be remedied by simply taking away one-half of the overseas assets from
Respondent, and otherwise leave the property distribution as it is. This does not solve the
fundamental problem of valuation of assets at the time of trial, and relieves the
Plaintiff/Respondent of her legal burden of establishing value.
The Trial Court's disbelief of Appellant's position does not abrogate the requirements of
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or the case law requiring specific findings as to
value. Appellant asserts that the rule of law is that the marital assets must have their value
established at the time of trial.1 The court cannot, as a matter of law, give one party
unidentified assets of no known value, to make up for the award to the other party of assets of
known value. The trial court cannot guesstimate, or adopt an "who cares" attitude, about this
rule of law because it finds a witness to be lacking in credibility. There must be specific

1

Acton v. Deliran, 111 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987); Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah
1985); Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988); Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233
(Utah 1983); Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d
684 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Rappeleye v. Rappeleye, 855 P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 1993);
Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah
1986).
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findings as to value, and evidence to support them. The Plaintiff/Respondent simply did not
meet her burden in this regard.

II.

COULD THE DISTRICT COURT HAVE MADE A FINDING, AT THE
TIME OF TRIAL, CONCERNING THE VALUE OF THE MONEY
TRANSFERRED OVERSEAS IN AUGUST 1991?

The Trial Court could not have made a finding regarding the value of the property held
overseas. It could not do this because there was no evidence presented at trial regarding the
value of overseas assets.
The only evidence presented at trial was that in August 1991 the Defendant sold an
apartment complex in Salt Lake City, and sent $870,000 of the proceeds to pay off a recorded
mortgage indebtedness. The evidence on this point was not disputed. What was disputed was
whether or not the Appellant had control over the Singapore corporation holding the debt.
Regardless of who controlled or owned that company, no evidence was ever presented as to the
value of that company.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Appellant did control the Singapore corporation, that does
not mean that he owned the company, or that it was worth $870,000 at the time of trial. Value
cannot be determined without an examination of the assets, debts, accounts payable, and/or
accounts receivable of a company. The trial court did not do this assessment as there was
absolutely no evidence presented regarding those aspects of the "company."
The lower court understood that just because the Appellant's ex-girlfriend said he
controlled the company did not mean that he could take money from the company in any manner
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he wished.

Assuming that the Appellant did control the company, there is a substantial

difference between having control of a company's operations, and having the ability to take
assets from it, which could leave it with necessary liquid assets to meet its obligations.
The lower court could not make a finding as to the value at trial because the Respondent
failed to meet her burden of providing any evidence on that issue.
To allow the trial court, on remand, to simply give the Appellant back his former wife's
one-half share of overseas assets, without making specific findings as to the value of those
assets, is to suggest to the lower court that it is free to arbitrarily, and capriciously, make
unsupported assumptions about the value of the Singapore corporation. This is the equivalent
of saying the Appellant lied at trial, therefore, the requirements of Rule 52, U.R.C.P., and the
case law, are suspended. Such an approach is not an appropriate remedy for perceived perjury.
This is contrary to established Utah law which requires court's to make specific findings
as to value, and not base the distribution of property on the trial court's impressions of the
parties.

HI.

CAN THE COURT AT THE TIME OF A REMAND HEARING MAKE A
NEW FINDING WITHOUT NEW EVIDENCE.

The trial court cannot make any new findings on remand because there was not sufficient
evidence adduced at trial to allow the trial court to make those necessary findings. The burden
was on the Plaintiff/Respondent to produce the necessary evidence. She failed to do this. Not
only did the Plaintiff/Respondent fail to produce the evidence, she also failed to attempt to do
any overseas discovery, not even a phone call. This fact was undisputed. The Plaintiff was
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granted two discovery extensions to perform overseas discovery. Even then she failed to do any
discovery.
In order to give the trial court the necessary evidence, the Plaintiff/Respondent must
fulfill the obligation placed in her by law to conduct discovery and present the evidence found
at a remand hearing.
A possible solution to this dilemma is to divide equally the known assets, also known as
the domestic assets. Then also divide equally any overseas assets. In this manner, the marital
estate would be divided equally. Neither party would bear the risk of a mistaken assumption
about value. This court could further allow the Plaintiff/Respondent a new discovery period
prior to a remand hearing in order to ensure that she is not in any way prohibited from
discovering all possible information.
Given these protections, the court would do all it could to give the Plaintiff/Respondent
her one-half share of the marital estate and still require that she meet her burden as to the
evidence. It would also grant to the Appellant his equitable share of the marital property and
not cut him off from receiving one-half of the overall marital estate just because the trial court
took and instant dislike to him.
It is better that the Respondent be allowed to do discovery prior to hearing on remand,
even though untimely, and another chance to meet her burden, than to base a property
distribution on suspicion and doubt, as opposed to evidence.
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CONCLUSION

The suggestions made to the lower court in footnote number one (1) of its memorandum
decision will not solve the problem. Awarding the Appellant all the overseas assets of any, will
not correct the flaws in the lower court's findings.
Without additional evidence, there will still be no basis to put a value on or make a
finding concerning any overseas asset. As long as that asset remains unvalued as of the time
of trial, no distribution, other than an equal distribution, can be supported as a matter of law.

RELIEF SOUGHT

Appellant requests that, as a solution to this problem, the Plaintiff/Respondent be given
additional time to do overseas discovery prior to hearing on remand. If the Respondent still
cannot produce sufficient evidence to support a finding as to value of overseas assets, the lower
court should be directed to distribute the marital estate as follows:
1.

One-half of known domestic assets to each party;

2.

One-half of unknown, unquantifiable, assets to each party.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of May, 1995.
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David A. McPhie
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH
Counsel for the Appellant hereby certifies that this petition is presented in good faith, and
not for purposes of delay.

DATED this 2nd day of May, 1995.

David A. McPhie
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I cause to be hand-delivered to Paul Felt, two copies of the
Appellant's Petition for Reconsideration or Hearing, at his office located at Suite #400, #79
South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah
DATED this 2nd day of May, 1995.

David A. McPhie
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of the memorandum decision, compounds, rather than solves, the problem.
The Appellant asserts in this petition for re-hearing, or reconsideration that the Court has
overlooked or misapprehended the nature of the dispute, the facts surrounding what the lower
Court actually found, and did not find, and the law involved.
The Appellant asserts that the lower Court did not value the marital estate at
$1,405,806.00, and specifically that the Trial Court could not, and did not attach any value to
any overseas assets. Appellant asserts that the lower court correctly did not do so in that there
was no evidence presented at the time of trial as to those assets' value, if any.
The Appellant agrees and accepts all other portions of the Court's memorandum decision.
The Appellant requests that the Court reconsider this, and reissue an amended
memorandum decision, or in the alternative, allow the parties oral argument in the matter.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The District Court absolutely did not, and could not, make a finding at the time of trial
as to the value of the money earlier transferred to the Singapore Corporation. The Court made
a finding that the $870,000.00 was transferred overseas in August of 1991. The appellant's
testimony, as is contained in the transcript, was that this money was sent to Yen Yang
Corporation, a Singapore Corporation, to pay off the mortgage owed on the Royal Garden
Apartments. Documents were produced at trial showing that the money had been borrowed to
buy the apartments, a promissory note signed, and that a subsequent mortgage was recorded in
Salt Lake County, securing the lender corporation. This testimony was unrefuted.
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In paragraph nineteen (19) of its Findings of Fact, the lower court found that the
appellant's testimony was lacking in credibility, that he controlled the Singapore corporation,
and that the court could not put a value on the corporation for lack of evidence. The court
found that the reason that there was a lack of evidence was because the Appellant was hiding
assets. The court make no finding as to what efforts the Plaintiff/Respondent made to discover
the truth about this issue, or what the Appellant had done to hide them. The lower court simply
found that the Appellant was not a credible witness.
The appellant vigorously denied any ownership or control in the Singapore corporation.
Without regard for the reasons why, there was simply no evidence at trial to support a finding
concerning the value of any alleged overseas asset of the parties.
The lower court did not make a finding that the Singapore corporation had $870,000.00,
or had any value at the time of trial, or that the Appellant had gotten any of the money. There
was absolutely no evidence presented at the time of trial as to what the Company's financial
condition was, or if it existed. The Respondent, before trial, sought and obtained two (2)
extensions of time in which to do overseas discovery, and then did none. This is uncontroverted.
The Plaintiff/Respondent, instead relief on her hope that the lower court, if it disbelieved the
Appellant, and found him to be a liar, would be tempted to, and would in fact, exceed its
authority, and attempt to punish him for lying, by granting the Respondent a disproportionate
share of the estate.
This Court, in its memorandum decision, has suggested to the District Court that if no
new findings can be made, it can simply rest on its initial findings, but take away from the
Plaintiff her one-half share of foreign assets, and that this will solve the problem. This will not
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solve the problem. Without new evidence, which will support findings concerning the value of
overseas assets at the time of trial, the trial Court will be in no better position to make adequate
findings at a remand hearing, than it was originally.

ARGUMENT

I.

DID THE LOWER COURT MAKE A FINDING THAT THE MONEY
TRANSFERRED OVERSEAS, IN AUGUST OF 1991, HAD A VALUE OF
$870,000.00 AT THE TIME OF TRIAL?

The answer to this question is clearly no. The Court's findings on this issue were
contained in Findings no. eighteen (18) and nineteen (19) which stated "Sale of the Royal
Garden. In August 1991 Defendant sold his interest in the Royal Garden Apartments for
$1,000,000.00 and transferred $870,000.00 overseas to Singapore." Finding No. 19 states that

Defendant's Overseas Assets. Although the Defendant testified that he had no
overseas assets and that the $870,000.00 in proceeds from the sale of the Royal
Garden Apartments was transferred by him to Singapore to pay a debt he owed
Yen Yang Shipping Company, the Court finds Defendant's testimony to be
lacking in credibility on this point. The Court carefully listed to the totality of
the testimony, considered Defendant's appearance and demeanor to arrive at this
finding. The Court heard and considered the testimony of Kay Jones McDonald
concerning Defendant's relationship with Yen Yang Shipping Company. The
Court finds that Ms. McDonald was a very credible witness and clearly testified
that Yen Yang was his based on her observations in Singapore when she was with
the Defendant. The Court has also considered Exhibit 40 which it finds
significant in arriving at this finding.
From documents introduced into evidence, (including Exhibit 40), and
from the testimony of witnesses at trial the Court finds that the Defendant
currently has undetermined but substantial assets overseas which are under his
control and which he is hiding from Plaintiff and this Court. Defendant's denial
5

of the existence of these assets is not credible. The Court further rules that the
Plaintiff should be awarded one-half of the Defendant's overseas assets, the exact
dollar amount to be determined when and if such information becomes available.
[Em|±asisaddedj
Three things are undeniable with regard to the above two referred to findings:
1. The trial Court thought the Appellant was a liar;
2.

The lower Court believed that the $870,000.00 mortgage debt owed on the

Apartments, was owed to a Company in Singapore which Appellant controlled; and,
3. That there was no evidence before the Court upon which it could base a finding as
to the then value, that is, the value at the time of trial of the previously transferred $870,000.
For this reason, the lower Court awarded the Respondent one-half of the unvalued,
unquantifiable assets.
Appellant denied that he had any interest or control in the Singapore Company to which
the $870,000.00 mortgage was paid.

A former girlfriend of Larry Perkins, Kay Jones

McDonald testified at trial that she had been to Singapore with Larry on a trip, and that she
could tell that Larry had control of the Singapore Corporation. The Court disbelieved Larry
Perkins, and believed Kay Jones McDonald.
The Appellant's point in this Motion for re-hearing or reconsideration of the
memorandum decision is that Judge Lewis knew that there was no evidence before her as to the
value of those monies on the date of trial. Not a shred of evidence was presented concerning
the mortgage monies and what had happened to them after being paid to the Singapore Company
to retire the mortgage debt the parties had owed. The lower Court was correctly concerned that
it knew nothing of the mortgage company's debt structure, investors identities, shares
outstanding, financial condition, cash on hand, or any other information which would allow it
6

to put a value on this corporation the Appellant was found to control.
The lower Court, obviously suspected that there could be a large amount of money sitting
overseas over which the Defendant/Appellant had control, but there simply no basis upon which
the Court could value it. The fact that the asset had a dollar value of $870,000.00 eighteen (18)
months earlier, in August, 1991, did not help the lower Court in making a finding as to its value
some eighteen months later, in February, 1993 when the trial took place.
This Court's memorandum decision, in footnote one, suggests that the problem of the
Court's findings can be remedied by simply taking away one-half of the overseas assets from
Respondent, and otherwise leave the property distribution as it is. This does not solve the
fundamental problem of valuation of assets at the time of trial, and relieves the
Plaintiff/Respondent of her legal burden of establishing value.
The Trial Court's disbelief of Appellant's position does not abrogate the requirements of
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or the case law requiring specific findings as to
value. Appellant asserts that the rule of law is that the marital assets must have their value
established at the time of trial.1 The court cannot, as a matter of law, give one party
unidentified assets of no known value, to make up for the award to the other party of assets of
known value. The trial court cannot guesstimate, or adopt an "who cares" attitude, about this
rule of law because it finds a witness to be lacking in credibility. There must be specific

1

Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987); Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah
1985); Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988); Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233
(Utah 1983); Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d
684 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Rappeleye v. Rappeleye, 855 P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 1993);
Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah
1986).
7

findings as to value, and evidence to support them. The Plaintiff/Respondent simply did not
meet her burden in this regard.

II.

COULD THE DISTRICT COURT HAVE MADE A FINDING, AT THE
TIME OF TRIAL, CONCERNING THE VALUE OF THE MONEY
TRANSFERRED OVERSEAS IN AUGUST 1991?

The Trial Court could not have made a finding regarding the value of the property held
overseas. It could not do this because there was no evidence presented at trial regarding the
value of overseas assets.
The only evidence presented at trial was that in August 1991 the Defendant sold an
apartment complex in Salt Lake City, and sent $870,000 of the proceeds to pay off a recorded
mortgage indebtedness. The evidence on this point was not disputed. What was disputed was
whether or not the Appellant had control over the Singapore corporation holding the debt.
Regardless of who controlled or owned that company, no evidence was ever presented as to the
value of that company.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Appellant did control the Singapore corporation, that does
not mean that he owned the company, or that it was worth $870,000 at the time of trial. Value
cannot be determined without an examination of the assets, debts, accounts payable, and/or
accounts receivable of a company. The trial court did not do this assessment as there was
absolutely no evidence presented regarding those aspects of the "company."
The lower court understood that just because the Appellant's ex-girlfriend said he
controlled the company did not mean that he could take money from the company in any manner
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he wished.

Assuming that the Appellant did control the company, there is a substantial

difference between having control of a company's operations, and having the ability to take
assets from it, which could leave it with necessary liquid assets to meet its obligations.
The lower court could not make a finding as to the value at trial because the Respondent
failed to meet her burden of providing any evidence on that issue.
To allow the trial court, on remand, to simply give the Appellant back his former wife's
one-half share of overseas assets, without making specific findings as to the value of those
assets, is to suggest to the lower court that it is free to arbitrarily, and capriciously, make
unsupported assumptions about the value of the Singapore corporation. This is the equivalent
of saying the Appellant lied at trial, therefore, the requirements of Rule 52, U.R.C.P., and the
case law, are suspended. Such an approach is not an appropriate remedy for perceived perjury.
This is contrary to established Utah law which requires court's to make specific findings
as to value, and not base the distribution of property on the trial court's impressions of the
parties.

in.

CAN THE COURT AT THE TIME OF A REMAND HEARING MAKE A
NEW FINDING WITHOUT NEW EVIDENCE.

The trial court cannot make any new findings on remand because there was not sufficient
evidence adduced at trial to allow the trial court to make those necessary findings. The burden
was on the Plaintiff/Respondent to produce the necessary evidence. She failed to do this. Not
only did the Plaintiff/Respondent fail to produce the evidence, she also failed to attempt to do
any overseas discovery, not even a phone call. This fact was undisputed. The Plaintiff was
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granted two discovery extensions to perform overseas discovery. Even then she failed to do any
discovery.
In order to give the trial court the necessary evidence, the Plaintiff/Respondent must
fulfill the obligation placed in her by law to conduct discovery and present the evidence found
at a remand hearing.
A possible solution to this dilemma is to divide equally the known assets, also known as
the domestic assets. Then also divide equally any overseas assets. In this manner, the marital
estate would be divided equally. Neither party would bear the risk of a mistaken assumption
about value. This court could further allow the Plaintiff/Respondent a new discovery period
prior to a remand hearing in order to ensure that she is not in any way prohibited from
discovering all possible information.
Given these protections, the court would do all it could to give the Plaintiff/Respondent
her one-half share of the marital estate and still require that she meet her burden as to the
evidence. It would also grant to the Appellant his equitable share of the marital property and
not cut him off from receiving one-half of the overall marital estate just because the trial court
took and instant dislike to him.
It is better that the Respondent be allowed to do discovery prior to hearing on remand,
even though untimely, and another chance to meet her burden, than to base a property
distribution on suspicion and doubt, as opposed to evidence.
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CONCLUSION

The suggestions made to the lower court in footnote number one (1) of its memorandum
decision will not solve the problem. Awarding the Appellant all the overseas assets of any, will
not correct the flaws in the lower court's findings.
Without additional evidence, there will still be no basis to put a value on or make a
finding concerning any overseas asset. As long as that asset remains unvalued as of the time
of trial, no distribution, other than an equal distribution, can be supported as a matter of law.

RELIEF SOUGHT

Appellant requests that, as a solution to this problem, the Plaintiff/Respondent be given
additional time to do overseas discovery prior to hearing on remand. If the Respondent still
cannot produce sufficient evidence to support a finding as to value of overseas assets, the lower
court should be directed to distribute the marital estate as follows:
1.

One-half of known domestic assets to each party;

2.

One-half of unknown, unquantifiable, assets to each party.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of May, 1995.
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David A. McPhie
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH
Counsel for the Appellant hereby certifies that this petition is presented in good faith, and
not for purposes of delay.

DATED this 2nd day of May, 1995.

/^t**^AAte&£.
David A. McPhie
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I cause to be hand-delivered to Paul Felt, two copies of the
Appellant's Petition for Reconsideration or Hearing, at his office located at Suite #400, #79
South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah
DATED this 2nd day of May, 1995.

t^-J+***-JA-M
David A. McPhie
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
COURT'S
: FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
:
CASE NO. 914902826
:

JERRI S. PERKINS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LARRY R. PERKINS,

:

Defendant.

:

The above-entitled matter came on for trial on February 2, 3,
and 4, and March 16, 1993 pursuant to notice, before the Honorable
Leslie A. Lewis.

Plaintiff was present in person and represented

by counsel, Paul S. Felt,

Defendant was present in person and

represented by counsel, David A. McPhie.

Each party made opening

statements, and the Court then heard

testimony

exhibits and heard closing arguments of counsel.

and received
The Court now

having fully considered the matter and reviewed the Exhibits
received, its notes, and the proposed Findings from plaintiff and
defendant, and good cause appearing, the Court now makes and enters
the following:

f

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Residency.

Plaintiff and defendant were each residents

of Salt Lake County, Utah for more than three months before the
filing of this action.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
COURT'S
: FINDINGS OP PACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
:
CASE NO. 914902826
:

JERRI S. PERKINS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LARRY R. PERKINS,

:

Defendant.

:

The above-entitled matter came on for trial on February 2, 3,
and 4, and March 16, 1993 pursuant to notice, before the Honorable
Leslie A. Lewis.

Plaintiff was present in person and represented

by counsel, Paul S. Felt,

Defendant was present in person and

represented by counsel, David A. McPhie.

Each party made opening

statements, and the Court then heard

testimony

exhibits and heard closing arguments of counsel.

and received
The Court now

having fully considered the matter and reviewed the Exhibits
received, its notes, and the proposed Findings from plaintiff and
defendant, and good cause appearing, the Court now makes and enters
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
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1.

Residency.

Plaintiff and defendant were each residents

of Salt Lake County, Utah for more than three months before the
filing of this action.
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Marriage. Plaintiff and defendant were wife and husband,

having been married in Salt Lake City, Utah, on June 3, 1969.
8^3.

Divorce. On February 4, 1993, the Court bifurcated this

matter and granted a Decree of Divorce reserving all other issues
for the trial. The plaintiff was awarded a Decree of Divorce from
the defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.

This

Decree of Divorce reserving all other issues was signed by the
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis on February 9, 1993.
4.

Custody and Visitation.

The parties have three minor

children born as issue of their marriage, to wit: , Jason R.
Perkins, age 17; Patricia L. Perkins (Tricia), age 16; and Tawna
Perkins, age 10.

The parties have stipulated that plaintiff is a

fit and proper person to be awarded the care, custody and control
of Jason and Tawna and that defendant is to have reasonable rights
of visitation at all reasonable times and places provided that
defendant shall give plaintiff reasonable notice prior to the
exercise of such visitation rights and that the Court would meet
with

Tricia

concerning

custody

and

make

a

custody

decision

concerning Tricia that is binding upon the parties. Subject to the
notice requirements, defendant's visitation rights are to at least
meet those in the standard Third District Court schedule.

The

Court met with Tricia on the 7th day of April, 1993, and Tricia
volunteered the following information:
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"I kinda want to be both places. . .I'd like to be with
my siblings more. I want to be able to be flexible. I
want my Mom to get full child support because I may want
to live with her fulltime soon. I can communicate better
with my Mom. But I love them both."
The Court finds after meeting with Tricia and considering all
that she said to the Court, her age, and her demeanor, that she has
no clear preference to live full-time with either parent at this
point and desires to be able to spend time on a flexible basis with
both parents.

The Court finds that the parties have been able to

effectively communicate and handle scheduling issues during the
pendency of this action concerning Tricia.

The Court therefore

awards joint legal custody to the parties and physical custody to
the plaintiff, subject to a

liberal and

flexible visitation

schedule with the defendant, structured by plaintiff, defendant and
Tricia.

The Court in reaching this decision considered the

placement of the siblings and the fact that the plaintiff has been
the primary care-giver for the majority of Tricia's life and has
exhibited an ability to communicate and parent effectively and a
willingness to work with the defendant to effectuate a liberal,
fair visitation schedule.
5.

Defendant's Education. The Court finds that defendant is

highly educated with a bachelor's degree in accounting and
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economics and a master's degree, and has received extensive workrelated education and experience in business, finance and banking.
6.

Defendant's Past Employment.

The Court finds that

defendant has been employed in the past in the fields of overseas
banking, shipping and construction and has developed expertise in
structuring investments and financial transactions in these areas.
In the 1970's defendant was employed overseas in Indonesia and
Greece and also made profitable personal investments in certain
foreign companies.

Plaintiff and defendant and their children

lived overseas during most of the time defendant was employed by
the First National Bank of Chicago in Indonesia and Greece and
later by certain companies in Greece.
7.

The Parties' Return to the United States.

In 1970,

defendant and plaintiff returned to the United States to live. At
that time, defendant left a substantial but {undetermined amount of
money and other assets overseas when he moved back to the United
States. After his return to the United States, defendant continued
to have access and control over said overseas assets.

The Court

finds defendant has always had exclusive control over the overseas
assets.
8.

Purchase of Marital Residence. Upon their return to the

United States, the parties purchased a house in Salt Lake City on
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4503 South Adonis Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah
House") which became the parties' residence.
was owned free and clear of any liens.

("Adonis Drive

In 1990, the house

In the early 1980's, the

house was put solely in plaintiff's name.
9.
parties

Parties' Lifestyle.
and their

family

During the 1980's and 1990, the

lived

a very

comfortable

lifestyle

enjoying an upper middle class standard of living which included
adequate money for the necessities of life, and luxuries and
included overseas and domestic trips, a large house in Olympus
Cove, and enrichment opportunities for the children and parties.
The Court found plaintiff very credible on this issue and did not
find defendant credible on this issue.

This lifestyle utilized

only defendant's income and plaintiff's in-house contributions of
time and energy to run the house and care for the family.
10.

Defendant's Employment During the 1980's.

During the

1980's defendant was employed primarily as the controller of Sales
West Marketing. He also worked for periods of time as a consultant
to other companies and had a financial interest in several other
companies

including

Ionian

Equipment

Company,

a

Liberian

corporation, Perperez Maritime Company, Ramona Enterprises and Apex
Equipment Company.
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Purchase of the Royal Garden Apartments.

In the early

1980's defendant purchased the Royal Garden Apartments in Salt Lake
City, Utah. During the 1980's these apartments created a positive
yearly cash flow which defendant utilized for family maintenance
and spending, as well as his own business investments.

Defendant

filled out a financial statement for First Interstate Bank in April
1987 which showed that the Royal Garden Apartments was providing
him a cash flow of $40,000 per year. The Court further finds that
the income tax returns filed by the parties from 1985 to 1992 and
which were prepared exclusively by defendant may not accurately
reflect all of the money which was available to the defendant and
his family for their use. The parties' income tax returns are the
only source document available from which to determine the amount
of money available to defendant and his family.
12.
defendant

Defendant's Investments in the 1980's. During the 1980's
purchased

and

sold

various

pieces

of

real

estate

including an office building, and said investments were profitable
in amounts which

exceeded

$150,000.

Defendant

received and

utilized the profit on these investments.
13.

Plaintiff's Skills and Activities During the 1980's.

Early in the marriage plaintiff was employed for a limited period
of time as a sales clerk at the then existing minimum wage.

PERKINS V. PERKINS

PAGE SEVEN

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

Plaintiff has one to two years of college credits, but has no
college degree.
unemployed

For the past twenty years plaintiff has been

and remained

unemployed

during

the course of the

marriage at defendant's request in order to be a homemaker and to
care for the parties' children, including the parties' diabetic
daughter, Tawna, and to be available to travel and to move at
defendant's

request.

In

so

doing,

plaintiff

has

foregone

opportunities for her own educational and career advancement.
Plaintiff currently has no meaningful job skills and is presently
unemployable in a job above minimum wage.
14.

Defendant's Current Employment.

The Court finds that

defendant's income during 1992 was when he was employed as a
mortgage broker for Utah First Mortgage was $39,590.54. Defendant
continues to be employed in this capacity and testified that his
income in the immediate future should be similar to his 1992
income.
15.

Plaintiff's

Current

Income.

The

Court

finds that

plaintiff earned no wages or income during the last twenty years
and only has a monthly unearned income if the dividends from the
Merrill Lynch account number 222-0000-016182 and the IBM stock
account number 14885-68530 are attributed to her. These dividends
currently total approximately $232 per month.

Plaintiff's income

is further enhanced if the monthly payments on the Royal Garden
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Note of $1#112 per month continue to be paid to plaintiff as
ordered by the Court in its temporary order of support.
16.

Plaintiff/s Future Plans. The plaintiff has enrolled in

a college nursing program and has testified she wants to obtain a
degree as a registered nurse and can accomplish this by 1998.
During the next five years the plaintiff has testified she will
have to devote her full attention to caring for her family,
including her diabetic daughter, and to her education and will not
be able to be employed or have any meaningful earned income if she
is to meet this goal.
17.

Separation of the Parties.

In April, 1991, defendant

told plaintiff that he no longer loved her or desired to be married
to her and the parties separated.
18.

Sale of the Royal Garden Apartments.

In August, 1991,

defendant sold his interest in the Royal Garden Apartments for $1
million and transferred $870,000 overseas to Singapore.
19.

Defendants Overseas Assets.

Although the defendant

testified that he had no overseas assets and that the $870,000
proceeds

from

the

sale

of

the

Royal

Garden

Apartments

was

transferred by him to Singapore to pay a debt he owed Yen Yang
Shipping Company, the Court finds defendants testimony to be
lacking in credibility on this point. The Court carefully listened
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and

considered

defendant's

appearance and demeanor carefully throughout to arrive at this
finding.
The Court heard and considered the testimony of Kay Jones
McDonald concerning defendant's relationship with Yen Yang Shipping
Company. The Court finds Ms. McDonald was a very credible witness
and

clearly

testified

that

"Yen

Yang

was

his

(defendant's)

corporation for his own use," based upon her observations in
Singapore, when she was with the defendant. The Court has also
considered Exhibit 40, which it finds significant, in arriving at
this finding.
From documents introduced into evidence (including Exhibit
40) , and from the testimony of witnesses at the trial, the Court
finds that defendant currently has undetermined but substantial
assets overseas which are under his control and which he is hiding
from plaintiff and this Court. Defendant's denial of the existence
of these assets is not credible.
plaintiff

should

be awarded

The Court further rules that

one-half

of defendant's overseas

assets, the exact dollar amount to be determined when and if such
information becomes available.
20.

Plaintiff's Needs for the Next Five Years.

The Court

rules that, even absent a consideration of the overseas assets, the
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division of assets as set forth in these Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law is necessary and reasonable because plaintiff
and the minor children residing with her will need to spend much of
the proceeds from these assets for their support and maintenance
during the next five years while plaintiff is in school obtaining
her nursing degree.

These needs are detailed further in other

paragraphs of these Findings of Fact.
21.

Child

Support.

Child

support

is to be calculated

pursuant to and consistent with the Utah Child Support Guidelines
based upon a consideration of all three children in plaintiff's
physical custody.

Defendant is presently employed as a mortgage

broker with Utah First Mortgage.

In 1992 defendant's payroll

records reflected wages of $39,590.64 which equals $3,299.22 per
month. Additionally, defendant makes $41 per month from a Merrill
Lynch investment account for a total monthly wage of $3,340.

As

previously stated, plaintiff has no earned income and if the
unearned income she has been receiving under the temporary support
order is attributable to her, plaintiff's gross monthly income is
$1,344.

Child support is to be based upon these figures.

The

Court rules that based upon Section 74-45-1, the defendant should
pay the sum of $183.17 per month per child for a total of $549.51
per month for the support of the three children.

However, if
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Tricia resides with the defendant for more than fifty percent of
the days of any month from the date of this ruling forward, a child
support adjustment shall be made pursuant to statute.

The Court

further rules that, pursuant to Section 15-2-1, Utah Code Ann.,
because

of

her

diabetes

and

anticipated

medical

needs, the

defendant is ordered to pay child support for Tawna until she
reaches the age of 21 years.
22.

Alimony.

The Court finds that plaintiff's reasonable

monthly expenses to maintain and educate herself and the two
children living with her will be $2,917 after plaintiff sells the
Adonis Drive House and purchases the house which she is now
renting. The Court finds that plaintiff's claimed monthly expenses
as set forth in Exhibit 162 are reasonable and necessary.

The

Court further finds that defendant has the ability to pay the sum
of $500 per month in alimony, and this is to be paid for the next
five years during which
education

to

enable

her

time plaintiff
to

contribute

will

be

to

her

involved
own

in

needs.

Thereafter, defendant is to pay plaintiff the sum of $300 per month
as permanent alimony until she remarries or cohabits.

The Court

further finds that plaintiff and the children will need more money
per month for their support than defendant has evinced the recent
ability to pay in alimony and child support, and thus it is fair
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and reasonable that plaintiff be awarded a larger share of the
parties' domestic assets as hereinafter set forth.

The Court in

determining alimony has considered plaintiff's need, defendant's
ability to pay, plaintiff's limited ability to earn, the standard
of living enjoyed by the parties during the marriage, defendant's
significantly greater ability to increase his income in the future,
given his education and work history, and the length of the
marriage, as well as the other facts set forth
23.

herein.

The Court rules that an Order to Withhold and Deliver be

issued pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 62-11-401, et seq.,
should the defendant become thirty (30) days delinquent in any of
his support obligations provided herein.
24.

Royal Garden Apartment Note.

The Court rules that the

plaintiff be awarded the proceeds of the Royal Garden Note which
has a principal value of approximately $39,434 as of February,
1993.

The defendant assigned

the proceeds of this Note to

plaintiff after the date of separation and has consistently treated
this Note as an asset belonging to plaintiff.
25.

Home Equity Loan. Beginning in 1991, the parties began

borrowing on a home equity line of credit against the Adonis Drive
House. The Court finds that plaintiff reasonably borrowed against
this line of credit because she and the children needed the money
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on which to live and to pay the monthly interest on the home equity
loan. The Court further finds that some of defendant's borrowings
against the home equity line of credit were not reasonable or
necessary.

This finding includes, but is not limited to the

December 19, 1992 borrowing when defendant took $8,750 from the
home equity line of credit and sent it overseas to Yen Yang
Shipping Company.

Thus, the Court finds that defendant, through

his unjustified depletion of the home equity line of credit, has
already taken an unjustifiable share of the equity from the Adonis
Drive House.

The home equity loan which must be paid to First

Security Bank when the home is sold currently stands at $100,724
when the interest payment for March, 1993 is included. Because the
maximum loan amount the bank will allow is $100,000, which was
reached

in December, 1992, plaintiff has been forced to pay

interest on the loan for January of $670.56, and February of
$613.69 out of the last monies she borrowed from the home equity
account.
26.

The Adonis Drive House.

The house is currently subject

to an earnest money agreement to be sold with a prospective closing
date of March 31, 1993 at a price of $270,000. At the time of the
anticipated sale, the home equity loan of $100,724 must be paid
from the sales proceeds as well as real estate commissions totaling
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(of which defendant will receive $1,000), and unpaid

property taxes of $5,233, leaving an equity of approximately
$151,843.

The Court finds that it is reasonable and proper based

upon all of the foregoing

facts and circumstances to award

plaintiff seventy-five percent of the net equity from the sale of
the Adonis Drive House and to award defendant twenty-five percent
of said net equity.
27.

West Valley House.

During the marriage the parties

purchased a house in West Valley City, Utah as an investment and
put the house in plaintiff's name. After the parties' separation,
the house was sold and the proceeds from the sale were put in an
interest bearing trust account which has a present value of
$85,950.89.

The Court rules that it is reasonable and proper to

award plaintiff one hundred percent of the proceeds from the sale
of the West Valley house.
28.

Plaintiff's Bank Accounts.

Plaintiff currently has

approximately $2,910 in a checking account which is the residual
amount left from a $5,000 gift from plaintiff's mother. The Court
rules it is reasonable and proper that plaintiff be awarded all
interest in her bank account.
29.

Defendant's Bank Accounts.

Defendant currently has

approximately $2,500 in his bank accounts.

The Court rules it is

reasonable and proper that defendant be awarded all interest in his
bank account.
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Vehicles, Plaintiff owns a 1992 Nissan Pathfinder which

she purchased for $22,000. The minor son is currently driving an
old Cadillac with a value of approximately $1,000. There is a 1968
Jaguar automobile which defendant represented in writing was owned
by the plaintiff and which has the stipulated value of $27,000.
Defendant owns a 1991 Ford Explorer with a value of $16,000.

The

Court rules it is reasonable and proper that plaintiff be awarded
her Pathfinder and the Cadillac. The Court finds it is reasonable
and proper that defendant be awarded his Ford Explorer and the
Jaguar

automobile,

and

the

boat

possession, and that defendant

and

trailer

in

defendant's

is to pay plaintiff half the

stipulated value of the Jaguar, before he can take possession of
the same.
31.

Insurance Policies. There are life insurance policies in

existence on the life of the defendant and each of the children
with the following cash values:
Defendant Larry Perkins
Jason Perkins
Tricia Perkins
Tawna Perkins
Lara Perkins (adult daughter)
There
plaintiff.

is no

life

insurance

policy

$39,674
2,502
2,405
3,504
4,294
on the

life of the

The Court rules that the financial needs of the

plaintiff and the children are such that plaintiff will need the
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cash surrender values to supplement the child support and alimony
awarded to plaintiff and that neither of the parties can afford to
pay the premiums which will be necessary to keep the insurance
policies in effect.
proper

for plaintiff

The Court rules that it is reasonable and
to be awarded the

above-described

life

insurance policies on the lives of the defendant, Lara, Jason and
Tricia so she can utilize the cash surrender value to supplement
her living expenses.

However, the Court rules that the life

insurance on the life of the diabetic daughter, Tawna, shall be
maintained by the defendant, as it will be difficult for Tawna to
procure insurance on her life in the future.
32.

Furniture and Personal Property. The Court approves the

stipulation of the parties made at the beginning of the trial that
each party shall retain the furniture, art objects and personal
property now in their separate possession.
33.

Health Insurance. The Court orders defendant to maintain

adequate health, accident, hospitalization and dental insurance on
the parties' children.

Defendant is ordered to pay all deductible

amounts applicable to said insurance. Plaintiff and defendant are
ordered to each pay one-half of all non-covered medical and dental
expenses for the children until they reach the age of 18 years and
to continue such payments beyond the age of 18 years if such health
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insurance can be kept in effect as to the children if they are in
school.

Defendant

is further

ordered

to make available to

plaintiff health insurance at his place of employment under the
COBRA laws if such is available through his employment, with
plaintiff to pay the premiums on her own health insurance.
34.

Debts and Obligations of the Parties.

The Court finds

that, other than the home equity loan which will be paid out of
proceeds from the sale of the Adonis Drive House, all postseparation debts and obligations should be paid by the party which
incurred the same.
35.

Defendant/s

Investments.

The Court rules that the

Merrill Lynch Ready Asset Account in the approximate amount of
$485, the International Holdings Account in the approximate amount
of $9,712 and the Pacific Fund A in the approximate amount of
$10,710, all of which are in defendant's name, should be awarded to
defendant.
36.

Defendant's Retirement. The Court rules that defendant's

IRA account in the approximate amount of $20,269 should be awarded
to defendant.

The plaintiff

has no compensating

retirement

account.
37.

The Children's Uniform Gift to Minors Account.

During

the course of their marriage, the parties established a Uniform
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Gift to Minors Account in each of their children's names.

The

approximate amount of each account for the minor children is:
Jason Perkins
Tricia Perkins
Tawna Perkins

$12,575
17,575
12,080

The Court rules that plaintiff shall have control over these
accounts and orders defendant to do whatever is necessary to make
plaintiff the custodian of said accounts. The Court further orders
plaintiff to spend the funds from these accounts only for the
benefit of the respective child who is the beneficiary of said
account.
38.

Tax Returns.

The Court rules that the parties should

file separate tax returns for the year 1993.

Plaintiff should be

entitled to claim Jason and Tawna as income tax exemptions and
defendant should be entitled to claim Tricia as an income tax
exemption beginning in 1993, provided he remains current on all of
the obligations of alimony, child support and other support set
forth herein.

The parties should sign such IRS or state forms or

documents as may be necessary to insure that each receives the
above-specified exemptions.
39.

Income Tax Liability. The Court finds because defendant

prepared the parties' joint income tax returns and claimed many
business deductions in an attempt to minimize taxable income and
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or

participation

in the

preparation in said income tax returns other than signing her name,
defendant is ordered to indemnify and hold plaintiff harmless for
any past due taxes, penalties, interest or other monies which may
be assessed against her by any governmental entity in connection
with said joint tax returns.
40.

Attorney's Fees.

The Court finds that plaintiff's

attorney's fees and costs for this divorce action are approximately
$28,700.

This amount includes the fees from plaintiff's first

attorneys, Campbell, Maack & Sessions; plaintiff's second attorney,
Richard Bigelow; and plaintiff's third attorney, Paul S. Felt, as
well as each attorney's supporting staff.

The Court finds that

plaintiff's attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $27,800 are
reasonable and necessary based upon the testimony or proffer by
each of plaintiff's attorneys as to his expertise in the field of
domestic relations law, his hourly fee being customary and standard
in the area, the type of work performed, the need for such work and
written detail of the hours spent by attorneys and staff working on
the case, as well as the complex nature of this case which included
understanding and tracing many of the defendant's overseas and
domestic investments.

The Court further finds that plaintiff has

no ability to pay these attorney's fees without the award of the
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assets

to

her
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set

forth

in
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these

Findings

of

Fact

and

The Court further finds that defendant is

being awarded substantial assets in this divorce and has other
undisclosed foreign assets and thus has ability to assist plaintiff
with payment of her attorney's fees and would be ordered to do so
but for the award of the greater share of the domestic assets of
the parties to plaintiff.

Therefore, the Court rules that based on

the distribution of the domestic marital assets, each party is
ordered to pay his or her own attorney's fees and costs.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes
and enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
Divorce

The Court has previously awarded plaintiff a Decree of
from

defendant

on

the

grounds

of

irreconcilable

differences.
2.

Custody and visitation of the parties' minor children

should be awarded as set forth in Finding of Fact number 4 above.
3.

Defendant

should be ordered

to pay child

support to

plaintiff as set forth in Finding of Fact number 21 above.
4.

Defendant should be ordered to pay alimony to plaintiff

as set forth in FJ i 1 i ii'j " f r \ '^'number 17- nt -T* '
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The real and personal property and assets of the parties

should be awarded as set forth \x\ SSUid-JnKjbi of Taofe nuirfbers 2yt
2%-j—22-r-»0, 31,-(32, 33, 35, 30 and- W aboud,
6.

The defendant

should

be ordered

ff

27,

^

r

to maintain health

insurance on the children of the parties and make health insurance
available to plaintiff under the COBRA law as set forth in Finding
of Fact number 33 above, ^

J-Ocffk*"^

ty

fa'

^

^

^

^

^

^

7.

ThenPikaintirf f sh^u3^di bey^Jwacd^d 0<?stp4vy£nj* oejhttfoly oyer

8.

Each party should be 'SfrdfeSred to p6y hi^ or her own

thej
hi!

attorney's fees and costs.
9.

The parties should be ordered to file separate tax

returns for 1993 with claimed exemptions as set forth in Finding of
Fact number 37 above.
10.

The Court will seal the file, pursuant to Section 30-3-4,

Utah Code Ann., upon stipulation of the parties, subsequent to
entry of a final Decree.
Dated this

_day of May, 1993.

LESaiE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

,
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing

Findings

following, this fl!^

of

Fact

and

Conclusions

day of May, 1993:

Paul S. Felt
Attorney for Plaintiff
79 S. Main, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
David A. McPhie
Attorney for Defendant
2105 E. Murray Holladay Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
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